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Abstract. We propose a light-weight client-server model of communi-
cation between program analyses. Clients are individual analyses and
the server mediates their communication. A client cannot see properties
of any other and the communication is anonymous. There is no cen-
tral algorithm standing above clients which would tell them when to
communicate what information. Clients communicate with others spon-
taneously, according to their actual personal needs. The model is based
on our observation that a piece of information provided to an analysis
at a right place may (substantially) improve its result. We evaluated the
proposed communication model for all possible combinations of three
clients on more than 400 benchmarks and the results show that the com-
munication model performs well in practice.
Keywords: Communication, program analysis, anonymous, online, client,
server, Apron, Box, Polka, Symbolic execution.
1 Introduction
The most common way how researchers combine program analyses starts by
selecting two or more existing analyses and then follows an invention of an
algorithm combining them into a new analysis. This process has two obvious
issues. First, the selection of analyses is often based only on our intuition, because
we have no evidence about dispositions of individual analyses for their mutual
cooperation. Indeed, this is actually what we are about to discover. If we further
realise that for n existing analyses we can create 2n − n− 1 combined analyses
(where some combinations may be less efficient than others), then our intuition
may easily lead as to a less promising choice. The second issues is the complexity
in the process of inventing of the new algorithm. The process is so complex
because we do not have solid data we could analyse in order to see promising
directions in our research. We can basically rely on our intuition again.
In this paper we propose an alternative approach in which analysers exchange
information by anonymous communication. An analyser asks others for an infor-
mation according its actual personal needs. There is no central algorithm which
would tell analysers when to communicate what information.
The approach is heavily based on an observation which we can experience
during experimentation with many existing analysers: A piece of information
provided to an analyser at a right place may (substantially) improve its result.
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By a right place we mean any line in the source code of an analyser where a
loss of precision may occur or where an additional information may simply help.
For example, a path insensitive analysis typically loses the precision in join nodes
of a control flow graph. So, all lines in the source code of the analyser where
the join operation is invoked are right places. Similarly, widening operator of
an abstract interpreter typically causes a loss of precision. So, each line where
the operator is called is the right place. Further, many analyses over- or under-
approximate semantics of some operators, like bit-operators (e.g. &, |, ^, in C),
floating point arithmetic, operators of fixed size integers (i.e. ignoring over- or
under-flows), pointer arithmetic operators, etc. All places in the source code
where these over- or under-approximated operators are invoked are right places.
Clearly, it should not be difficult for a researcher to identify right places in his
analyser, because he should be familiar with the source code.
The goal of the approach is to allow a delivery of information to right places
identified in an analyser (to allow reduction of the precision loss occurring there).
So, we extend the code in each right place by issuing communication queries to
other analysers. For example, a query may ask other analysers for possible values
of a certain variable at a given control location. We also need to extend each
right place by a code translating the received information into data which will
be then used in that right place as usual (i.e. as any other available data).
An analyser is further supposed to answer queries from other analysers. For
example, a received query for possible values of a certain variable at some control
location may involve a search for the variable in analyser’s memory model and
encoding the retrieved values into a response message. Code for answering queries
can be added into an analyser as a separate answering module.
If an analyser uses an information from other analysers in some of its right
places, then we can ask whether correctness and termination of its analysis
is still preserved or not. For example, an analyser may fail to build program’s
over-approximation if its computation is affected by incomplete information from
other analysers who build program’s under-approximation. Therefore, an anal-
yser may also need a code issuing special queries, which allow it to ensure cor-
rectness and termination of whole its extended source code without consideration
of properties of any other analyser.
Once we extended n analysers A1, . . . , An as was outlined above, we can use
them for simultaneous and cooperative analysis of a given program:
A1 A2 An
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For each analyser Ai we see its source code with extended right places ,
places with special queries , and the module for answering queries . Ar-
rows show the communication channels (information flow). All communication
is mediated through a shared medium . The communication is thus in the
client-server style. Clients are individual analysers and the medium stands for
the server. Observe that each analyser communicates only in fixed and a priori
determined places in its code: (1) in the extended right places, (2) in the places
for special queries, and (3) in the module for answering queries. All other code
is intact and operates as usual.
A communication query of any kind can only be issued from a client (when
its execution reaches or place). The query then goes directly to the server.
This is depicted in the scheme by arrows from or to the outer box of the
server. The server then broadcasts the received query trough the channel to
response modules of all clients (including the one initiating the query). Once
the server receives answers from response modules of all clients it combines them
into a single response message and sends it back to the place or where the
query was originally issued.
The biggest challenge in this approach is how to deal with incompatibility of
individual analysers. First of all, each analyser builds its own internal represen-
tation of an analysed program. For example, CPAchecker [27] builds a control
flow graph (CFG) directly from a C source code such that edges are labeled by
corresponding C expressions. Bugst [26], in contrary, translates the C program
into LLVM and the CFG is constructed from the assembly. KLEE [29] goes even
further, because it applies several compiler optimisations to the LLVM transla-
tion. Control flow graphs constructed by analysers for the same program thus
almost always differ in numbers of control location, branchings, join nodes, com-
position of loops (e.g. due to optimisations), function inlining, and so on. In
this setting a query “give me possible values of the variable a at the control
location 10” can be clear only for the analyser who issues this query. Indeed,
another analyser may have quite different interpretation for the “location 10”
and the variable a may be unaccessible there. Moreover, the other analyser may
use different names for variables (e.g. due to transformation to LLVM), so the
“variable a” can be completely unknown identifier.
The second issue is that each analyser builds its own model of program’s
memory. For example, stack variables can be organised differently in different
tools, so their addressing may also differ (note that we cannot rely on names
of variables). Dealing with program’s heap is especially difficult, because repre-
sentation of address space may differ significantly. For example, some analysers
assign unique identifiers to newly allocated blocks, some analysers recycle the
identifiers when blocks are released, other do not, and dynamic analyses use
physical addresses (e.g. in testing).
We resolve the incompatibility of internal program representations by in-
troducing unifying representation called canonical program, and we resolve the
incompatibility in models of address spaces by introducing unifying representa-
tion called canonical memory. These canonical representations do not replace
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original internal representations in analysers. Each analyser still performs its
analysis on its own internal representations. Both canonical representations are
used exclusively for the purpose of communication. Namely, each communication
query starts with its translation from terms of analyser’s internal representations
to terms of canonical representations, and once the query is received by an anal-
yser, the first thing is its opposite translation. In the scheme above there are
depicted all these translations places using the symbol . We see that data in
canonical representations flow only through the server.
Now we have a general overview of the approach. It remains to define pre-
cisely what queries may clients actually issue to the server, what are their exact
properties and requirements, and how both canonical representations look like.
All these things together represent a communication protocol of our approach.
We define it in Section 2. Namely, in Section 2.1 we describe what communica-
tion queries we need and why, then in Sections 2.2–2.5 we define both canonical
representations, and in Sections 2.6 and 2.7 we formally define all queries for
clients and the server using the introduced terminology.
As we already mentioned, the approach does not allow a client to insert a
code which would be somehow related or dependent on any other client. This
requirement is necessary, because communication of client during an analysis of a
program is completely anonymous. The positive side of that requirement is that
once the communication protocol is integrated into a client, the client can be
run with any other clients (also implementing the protocol). On the other hand,
clients exchange information in rather unorganised manner. Indeed, a client asks
for an information whenever its execution reaches some of its right places. We
have thus very right to ask how much effective this unsupervised data exchange
can be in practice. In this context we emphasise the importance of Section 3
where we present results from our experimental evaluation.
2 The communication protocol
A client is a program analyser or a program analysis inside an analyser which
is able to communicate with other clients during analysis of a given program. A
server is a program utility (or a module) mediating the communication between
clients. A client can only communicate with the server and has no information
about other clients, except their count. Data exchanged between the server and
a client are received in exactly the same order as they are sent.
There is a time-out for the whole communication common to all clients and
the server. After the time-out both the server and any client may completely ig-
nore any communication queries. Also, any communication query not terminated
before the time-out can be terminated immediately without any response.
Given a program written in a certain programming language, a concrete pro-
gram state is an element of the concrete semantics of the language, an abstract
state space is any subset of a client’s interpretation (e.g. abstraction or gener-
alisation) of the semantics of the language, and an abstract program state is an
element of an abstract state space.
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2.1 What communication queries we need?
The purpose of this section is to explain on an intuitive level what communication
queries we established for the protocol and why. We shall survey principles of
the communication from the point of view of a single client. We will observe the
client in different situations from which purposes of individual communication
queries will become apparent.
We suppose our client performs the standard interval analysis [7]. And for
simplicity of the presentation we put the client into an ideal setting: All com-
municating clients use the canonical program and memory as their internal rep-
resentations and they use same variable names for same addresses.
Let clients analyse the following simple program (nodes model the instruction
counter, solid edges represent program transitions, and dotted edges represent
arbitrary number of (unimportant) solid edges):
1 8
2 4
a=1
6 7
b=a
3 5
a=2
We start the observation in the moment when our client already performed its
analysis along paths 1,2,4,6 and 1,3,5,6. So, value of a at the node 6 is the
interval [1,2]. Since the node 6 is a join node (a loss of precision may occur
there), the client decides to get value of a also from other clients, in order to
compute a more precise value for b at the node 7. Therefore, the client issues
“get values” query to all clients (through the server) at the node 6 for values of a
computed for both paths leading to the node 6. Each client is supposed to return
an over-approximation of its current knowledge about the queried memory. And
the server returns to the client an intersection of individual over-approximations.
Let us suppose one of the clients is “evil”. It explored only the path 1,2,4,6
so far, so it only knows that the variable a has value 1 at the node 6. It thus
returns the equality a = 1 as an over-approximation of its current knowledge
about a. Note that it could also return formulae like a > 0, a = 1∨a > 5, or even
true (i.e. any possible value for a) as an over-approximation. Of course, clients
attempt to return the most precise over-approximations. As a consequence our
client receives from the server a conjunction a = 1∧ (1 ≤ a ≤ 2)∧ϕ1 ∧ . . .∧ϕn,
where a = 1 is the answer from the evil client, 1 ≤ a ≤ 2 is the answer from
our client (a representation of the interval [1,2]), and ϕi are answers from all
other clients. Let us suppose the formula is equivalent to a = 1. Then our client
computes the value of b at the node 7 as the interval [1,1]. If this value is not later
recomputed to the correct over-approximation [1,2], our client may finish the
analysis with an unsound result, i.e. without achieving of an over-approximation
of the program’s memory.
In order to prevent such situations each client has to notify all other clients
(through the server) about each change in its abstract state space. For example,
when the evil client updates its abstract state by executing the edge (3,5), it
has to send a notification “on location outdated” to all clients. The notification
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is coupled with the node 5 and the path 1,3,5 to describe where the change
was made and what program paths were considered in the update. Other clients
react to the notification s.t. they recompute the corresponding parts of their
state space (this may trigger re-computations of transitively dependent parts).
Note that it is sufficient for a client to react only to those notifications whose
nodes and paths inform the client that some of its “get values” queries issued so
far may now return different answers.
Let us return to the scenario where the computation of our client was based
on the answer a = 1. As the evil client later explores the other path 1,3,5,6 it
has to send notifications about updates. Our client can ignore them until the
node 6. That is because our client calls “get values” only at the node 6. When
the evil client gets to the node 6 along the path, it has to send a notification
with the node 6 and the path 1,3,5,6. Our client reacts to the notification by
recomputing its state at the dependent node 7 the same way as before. Namely,
it first issues a new “get values” query at the node 6 for both paths. Since the
evil client knows now both possible values of a at the node 6, its answer can be
a formula a = 1 ∨ a = 2. So, our client now computes the correct interval [1,2]
for b at the node 7. Note that the change of the state at the node 7 may trigger
re-computations of abstract states at dependent nodes along the path 7,8.
It may further happen that the evil client stops execution of the path 1,3,5,6
before reaching the node 6. One reason for that can be a detected infeasibility of
the path, another reason can be a client’s decision to spend remaining analysis
time in other parts of the program, e.g. in the path 7,8. While the first case
implies for our client a sound value [1,1] of b in the node 7, the other case implies
an unsound result. It may also happen that our client explores the whole program
even before the evil client explores the path 1,3,5,6. If our client terminates
without waiting for the evil one, then it can again get an unsound result.
All these situations can be resolved if our client can ask others (through
the server) whether they have already built over-approximations of the pro-
gram’s memory. It does not matter whether a client builds an over- or under-
approximation. The query can always be answered (often quite trivially). In
particular, a client may answer yes to a query “is memory over-approximated?”
only if its current abstract state space captures the program’s memory for all
feasible paths.
In our example, if the evil client early terminates exploration of the path
1,3,5,6 due to its infeasibility, then its answer yes to the query “is memory over-
approximated?” (together with the same answer from all other clients) implies
that our client may terminate with “succeess” state (the memory is successfully
over-approximated). On the other hand, if the evil client never answers yes to the
query till the time-out, then our client correctly terminates with “failure” state
(i.e. it failed to compute an over-approximation). Finally, since our client builds
an over-approximation and it uses the query “get values”, it cannot terminate
with the “succeess” state until all clients answer yes to the query.
Waiting until the time-out with repetitive asking clients “is memory over-
approximated?” is a wast of resources. Moreover, our client may terminate with
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“failure” just because the evil client never responds yes to the query, e.g. be-
cause it computes an under-approximation. Our client may solve the issues by
a simple strategy which we call “safety outdate”. First it estimates a time point
before the time-out. Before this time point it performs its analysis as described
above. At the time point it marks for re-computation each state in its abstract
state space, which was directly or indirectly computed from values received from
other clients (via “get values”). And from that time point on the client never
performs “get values” query. The time point should be estimated s.t. the client is
able to recompute the marked (and dependent) parts of its state space before the
time-out. In our example, at the time point our client marks for re-computation
abstract states attached to nodes along the path 7,8 (for both paths leading to
the node 7). The client then evaluates the edge (6,7) without performing “get
values” query, i.e. it uses its interval [1,2] of a at the node 6. Note that the
re-computation of marked states does not imply that all information received
from other clients before the time point is lost. Typically, some invariant prop-
erties can be preserved in strongly connected components. They can still have a
(significant) impact on the precision of a client’s result.
Finally, there are situations when a client may apply the safety outdate even
before the estimated time point, for example, when all other clients compute
under-approximations or when they lose a chance to achieve over-approximations
due to failures in their analyses, e.g. an SMT solver cannot decide satisfiability
of some formula, etc. For that purpose the protocol offers clients a query “can
improve memory over-approximation?”. A client returns yes, if it can make a
progress towards memory over-approximation. Note that the answer yes does
not imply the client will necessarily ever do such progress. The safety outdate
can be performed once all clients respond no to the query.
Summary The query “get values” allows clients to exchange information about
memory content (via formulae). All other queries “on location outdated”, “is
memory over-approximated?”, and “can improve memory over-approximation?”
are the special queries. They allow clients to achieve soundness of their results.
The final step of the integration of the protocol into a client is a check whether
there is no communication scenario, which would produce an unsound result.
Boosting convergence We further extended the protocol by a concept allowing
clients to boost convergence of their analyses to final results. Due to space limi-
tation we omit its presentation here. An interested reader may find its detailed
description in our technical report [23]. Note that our evaluation uses this con-
cept.
2.2 Canonical program
A canonical program is a model of the program’s instruction counter. Its pur-
pose is to allows clients (operating on their internal program representations) to
specify the counter and program paths in queries (like “get values”) uniformly.
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A control-flow graph is a popular and widely used program representation
in analysers. Furthermore it also models the instruction counter. We can thus
take and adapt the code of some chosen analyser and use it to easily and quickly
implement a program utility for building canonical programs (used then by all
clients). The adaptation of the client’s code might involve some pre- and/or post-
processing of a raw control-flow graph produced by the client’s code. A resulting
control-flow graph (canonical program) must have the following properties:
The instruction counter is modeled by nodes and edges represent possible
transitions of the counter. Each sub-program is modeled by a separate compo-
nent with a single entry and exit node. Each node is labeled by a set of indices of
the program’s lexical tokens. We describe the computation later. We distinguish
two kinds (labels) of edges: branching and call. An edge is branching if its head
node has out-degree at least 2. An edge is a call edge if the label of its head
node contains indices of all tokens which correspond to a call expression of the
program.
Before we explain computation of labels of nodes we define meaning of nodes:
If the instruction counter is at a certain node of a canonical program then it
means that the instruction counter is at the position in the source code s.t.
indices of all lexical tokens of an instruction to be executed next belong to the
label of the node and indices of all lexical tokens of any predecessor instruction
belongs to the label of some predecessor of the node.
Each edge of a canonical program corresponds to some part of program’s
source code (which is executed whenever moving from its head to tail node).
Therefore, according to the meaning of nodes above we compute the label of
a node as a union of indices of lexical tokens of source code which correspond
to at least one out-going edge from the node. This construction assumes that
whenever two edges share some source code tokens, then the edges have the same
head node.
Consider the C function (with indexed lexical tokens) depicted in Fig. 1 (a).
A canonical program for this function is depicted in Fig. 1 (b) (for now ignore
links ?1, ..., ?10). The left top node is labeled by the set {13, 14, 15}. This node
thus represents the instruction counter right before execution of the assignment
i=0. By taking its only out-edge we get to node {19..23}. It represents the
program counter right before execution of the condition i<node->nkeys in the
while loop. We can further see that indices of some lexical tokens do not belong
to label of any node, e.g. semicolons, some brackets, operators, keywords, etc.
Their purposes are captured by the shape of the graph. But it does not mean
that we have to exclude them. It depends on our conventions. Finally, observe
that the right bottom node (the exit node) has an empty set of labels.
Information about indices of program’s lexical tokens may not be directly
available in an analyser. On the other hand information about program lines is
available practically always. We can get indices of tokens by constructing one-to-
one mapping between program lines and tokens: we only syntactically reshape
the original program s.t. each lexical token is put into a separate line. Then we
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int1 btree contains2(3int4 key5,6btree node7*8 node9)10{11
int12 i13=14015;16
while17(18i19 <20 node21->22nkeys23 &&24 node25->26key27[28i29]30 <31key32)33
++34i35;36
if37(38i39 <40 node41->42nkeys43 &&44 node45->46key47[48i49]50 ==51key52)53
return54 155;56
if57(58 node59->60child61[62i63 +64165]66 ==67NULL68)69
return70 071;72
return73 btree contains74(75key76,77 node78->79child80[81i82 +83184]85)86;87
}88
(a)
13..15
19..23 25..32
34..35
39..43 45..52
59..68
74..86
71 55
C
B
B B
B
B
B
B B
B
B
1
5
10
7
6
8
2
9
3 4
1
2
3
4
5
6
(b)
Identifier btree contains key node i
Segment 1 2 3 4
(d)
i=014
i<node->nkeys
20
i>=node->nkeys20
node->key[i]<key31
++i
34
e
node->key[i]>=key
31
node->key[i]==key
51
@ret=1
55
tmp=node->child[i+1]
tmp==NULL
67
tmp!=NULL
x
@ret=0
7167
74 tmp1=contains(key,tmp)
67
@ret=tmp1
74
node->key[i]!=key
51
6
7
8
23
4
1
5
10
9
x
x
(c)
Fig. 1. (a) A C function with lexical tokens indexed. (b) A canonical program of
the function. Labels B and C stand for branching and call kinds respectively. Some
edges are marked by numbers for purposes of presentation. (c) An internal program
representation of the function. Bold numbers labelling edges are indices of root tokens
of the corresponding C expressions in (a). Symbols ?1, ..., ?10 represent links between
nodes of (b) and (c). (d) A mapping between (l-value) identifiers of (a) and segments.
construct the canonical program from the reshaped program. Note that for C
programs there are already tools available for this functionality [26,27].
2.3 Context: a specification of a set of paths in a canonical program
Here we propose a simple specification for a set of program paths in a canon-
ical program with restricted expressivity. The restricted expressivity is not an
issue, because conversions of paths between a canonical program and an internal
program representation often loses precision (see the next section).
A filter is a set of kinds of edges of a canonical program. So, there are only
four filters: ∅, {branching}, {call}, and {branching, call}. A context constructed
for a given filter is a list of edges whose kinds belong to the filter. A path in a
canonical program belongs to a context if and only if the context is equal to a list
of edges constructed from the path s.t. each edge with a kind belonging to the
construction filter of the context is preserved and any other is removed. Finally,
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a pair “node, context” represents each path which belongs to the context and
which goes from the program’s entry to the node.
Let us consider the node {13..15} from the canonical program in Fig. 1 (b).
If we couple it with the empty context [] constructed for the filter ∅ then the pair
represents all paths reaching the node. If we couple it with the context [6,6,6,6]
(for brevity we use numbers marking edges) constructed for {call} filter, then
the pair represents all possible paths to the node performing 4 recursive calls.
Multi-threading: A construct creating a new thread can be modeled in a canon-
ical program by an artificially introduced branching (e.g. by two parallel edges
with special labels). Different threads can then be distinguished via a context.
2.4 Links between canonical and internal program representation
We present a simple recipe how to compute links (mapping) between nodes in
a canonical program and nodes of an internal program representation. They
allow a client to convert a pair “node, context” from a canonical program to
an internal program representation and back. The recipe requires that a client
builds its internal program representation from the reshaped program (see end
of Sec. 2.2).
Let (h, t) be an edge of an internal program representation s.t. there is a
source code line associated with the edge, and let n be a node of the canonical
program containing the line in its label. We extend the mapping between nodes
in any of the following three cases: (1) If in-degrees of both n and h are zeros,
then link h with n. (2) If t is an exit node and n has a successor with the empty
label and with the out-degree 0, then link t with the successor of n. (3) If all
successor edges of t have lines associated and all the lines belong to the label of
a single successors node n′ of the node n and n 6= n′, then link t with n′.
Fig. 1 (c) depicts an internal program representation (a control-flow graph)
for the C function at Fig. 1 (a). Links between nodes of Fig. 1 (b) and (c)
were computed by the recipe above. Namely, the link ?1 was set according to
the case (1), links ?2, ?3, ?4, according to the case (2), and all others accord-
ing to the case (3). Observe there are nodes without links. A client cannot
issue queries at these nodes. Also, it has to answer true for “get values” queries
there. Finally, conversions of paths between internal program representation and
canonical program may lose precision. Let us consider a path [14,20,67,67,74] in
Fig. 1 (c) (we use numeric labels for brevity). Using links ?1, ?4, ?5, ?6, ?10, for
a filter {call, branching} we can express the path by two contexts [1,2,5,6] and
[1,3,4,5,6] (we use numeric labels for brevity) s.t. we consider a union of their
paths, or for a filter {call} by a context [6]. But in both cases we lose precision.
2.5 Canonical memory
Here we discuss how clients can uniformly encode or decode information about
memory in answers from “get values” queries in order to use it in their (different)
memory representations. We call the uniform representation a canonical memory.
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Addressing of global and stack memory-referencing identifiers is based on the
common segment-offset model: an address is simply a pair of numbers segment
(an identifier of some memory pool) and offset (a shift to a certain byte inside the
pool). An offset is a non-negative integer. A segment is either 0 (a representation
of the NULL pointer) or a unique positive integer associated with a program iden-
tifier. We put identifiers into a list sorted by their token indices and segments are
then indices of the identifiers in the list. In Fig. 1 (d) we see assignments of seg-
ments to identifiers of the function in Fig. 1 (a). A sequence of bytes starting at a
given segment and offset can have any of the following type interpretations: (1)
i8,i16,i32,i64/u8,u16,u32,u64 – a signed/unsigned 8,16,32,64-bit integer.
(2) f32,f64 – a 32,64-bit floating point number. (3) seg,off – a representation
of addresses (pointers). Data of composed types have to be communicated per
their attributes.
A dereference is a triple consisting of a segment expression, an offset expres-
sion, and a type. A segment expression is either a segment, or a dereference of the
type seg. An offset expression is any integer expression possibly containing deref-
erences of any integer or off type. A dereference represents a type-interpreted
values of bytes pointed to by its segment and offset expressions. A dereference
is called basic if neither segment nor offset expression contains any dereference.
A value in the memory referenced by a program identifier is directly denoted
by a basic dereference. A value stored in a non-leaked memory block in the
program’s heap is always accessible (directly or indirectly) from some program
identifier. This “access path” from the identifier can always be expressed in our
model by nesting dereferences in segment and offset expressions. For example,
we express a value denoted by an expression node->nkeys appearing in the C
function at Fig. 1 (a). A value of the pointer node we express by basic derefer-
ences (3, 0, seg) and (3, 0, off) (see Fig. 1 (d)). If we assume that the attribute
nkeys is of int type and it has an offset 12 in the structure btree node, then
the value is represented by a non-basic dereference ((3, 0, seg), (3, 0, off) + 12,
i32) in our model. Note that records deeper in the call stack are accessed exactly
the same way as the memory in the program’s heap.
2.6 Client
Each client has to implement the following functions (formalising queries dis-
cussed in Sec. 2.1 in terms of Sec. 2.2, 2.3, and 2.5):
• get values(node,context,dereferences) -> formula
A client is queried for values in the memory referenced by the passed set
of dereferences. The pair node,context describes program states where
to read the values. A client’s answer must be an over-approximation of its
current knowledge about the referenced memory. The answer must be en-
coded as a quantifier-free first order logic formula over dereferences in SMT-
LIB2 [30] format. A formula may only contain interpreted symbols from
theories of integers, Peano arithmetic, and reals. Dereferences are the only
allowed uninterpreted symbols. We encode a dereference (s, o, t) as an appli-
cation of a binary function symbol DEREF t to arguments s and o.
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• on location outdated(node,context) -> nothing
A client is notified that the abstract state space of some client has been
updated. The pair node,context identifies program states the update was
relevant for.
• is memory over approximated() -> bool
A client may answer true only if its current abstract state space captures the
program’s memory for all feasible paths. In particular, the client is supposed
to return false in any of the following cases:
1. Its function can improve memory over approximation returns true.
2. It has not sent a notification on location outdated to the server yet
about an update of some of its abstract state.
3. An over-approximation of the program’s memory cannot be achieved due
to failures in its computation, e.g. failures in an SMT solver, etc.
• can improve memory over approximation() -> bool
A client returns true if it can make a progress towards memory over-
approximation. The answer true implies only a possibility of the progress.
2.7 Server
A server has to provide the following functions to clients (expressed in terms of
Sec. 2.2, 2.3, and 2.5):
• get values(node,context,dereferences) -> formula
The server broadcast the query to functions get values of all clients. Then
it returns a conjunction of received formulae to the client issuing the query.
• on location outdated(node,context) -> nothing
The server broadcast the notification to functions of the same name of all
clients. Note that each client has to call this function whenever its abstract
state space is changed.
• is memory over approximated() -> bool
The server broadcast the query to functions of the same name of all clients.
Then it returns the conjunction of individual answers.
• can improve memory over approximation() -> bool
The server broadcast the query to functions of the same name of all clients.
Then it returns the disjunction of individual answers.
3 Evaluation: Box, Polka, and Symbolic execution
We wanted to know how much clients may ideally improve their results using
our communication model. We thus experimentally evaluated a limit case, where
clients were offered maximum opportunities for the communication: a client can
communicate at each node where a loss of precision may occur (e.g. joins, loop
heads, nodes around pointer or other (unsupported) operations), and there is a
negligible overhead of message delivery.
12
We embedded three clients into a single tool [28]: two abstract interpreters
Box (intervals) [25], Polka (polyhedrons) [25], and the classic Symbolic execu-
tion [17]. The tool implements the server. Clients share a single internal program
representation modelling also a canonical program. Since all clients run on a sin-
gle main thread, they perform computations in small regularly interleaved steps.
A step corresponds to an update of an abstract state space by taking one or
more edges which all always share either head or tail node. A client determines
by itself which edges it will process in what computation step. A client may issue
communication queries to the server only during its step. Responses from other
clients are also computed and returned in that step.
We evaluated clients in five different configurations. Each configuration spec-
ifies what clients are used and whether they can communicate or not. We denote
configurations using the following abbreviations: b*p*s, b+p+s, b+p, b+s, and
p+s. Symbols ‘b’, ‘p’, and ‘s’ stand for Box, Polka, and Symbolic execution
respectively, and ‘+’ and ‘*’ stand for communication enabled and disabled re-
spectively. For each configuration we assume that either all clients communicate
with each other (the use of ‘+’) or none of them (the use of ‘*’).
We performed the evaluation on the SV-COMP 2015 [31] benchmark suite,
revision 571. In order to make the evaluation manageable for us, we put a require-
ment that the whole evaluation (all five configurations) should finish within one
week of continuous computation1. We thus picked 10 randomly chosen bench-
marks from each directory (or less if there was not enough) and so we got 473
benchmarks. We further set a time-out at 2.5 minutes and a memory-out 512MB
for each client in each configuration. It means, for example, that b+p had the
time-out 5 minutes and the memory-out 1024MB, b*p*s had the time-out 7.5
minutes and the memory-out 1536MB, etc. Remember, clients share time (steps
are interleaved) and memory (all run on a single thread) within a configuration.
We compared results of each combination of configurations. The comparison
was always done per client: given two configurations and a client appearing in
both of them we compare only results of that client (i.e. we ignore results from all
others). Note that clients are independent, so they produce independent outputs.
We focused on two kinds of measurements. First, we compared the precision
of invariants computed by clients Box and Polka. Symbolic execution does not
provide this kind of information. The clients attempt to compute for each node a
strongest invariant over-approximating all concrete states which can be seen at
the node. The results are presented in Fig. 2. The numbers for “Comparison per
node” are summary counts of nodes of all considered benchmarks together. And
the numbers for “Comparison per benchmark” are simply counts of benchmarks.
Note that for each client there were only considered those benchmarks for which
the client terminated with the state “Success” in both compared configurations.
We can observe the following facts about the data in Fig. 2:
– Each configuration may bring us improvements over others: We can clearly
see this phenomena for all pairs of configurations in both kinds of compar-
isons in tables of both clients.
1 One process on a server: 2xIntel Xenon E5-2650 @ 2GHz, 64GB RAM, Debian 4.6.3.
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Configuration Comparison per node Comparison per benchmark
1st 2nd fail neq eq 1st 2nd fail neq 1st 2nd 1st! 2nd! eq!
b*p*s b+p+s 13 246 13021 627 9563 1 20 56 191 23 148 35
b*p*s b+p 13 342 15042 613 10043 1 37 46 243 7 186 34
b*p*s b+s 13 309 12444 450 8202 1 10 36 128 28 115 71
b+p+s b+p 13 1167 25025 3707 1851 1 42 120 123 43 48 97
b+p+s b+s 13 142 24753 1170 708 1 14 66 34 43 17 155
b+p b+s 13 889 21311 1798 2899 1 41 106 76 56 28 99
Configuration Comparison per node Comparison per benchmark
1st 2nd fail neq eq 1st 2nd fail neq 1st 2nd 1st! 2nd! eq!
b*p*s b+p+s 20 487 10616 401 12672 1 42 38 199 16 157 43
b*p*s b+p 26 319 11691 168 12923 1 39 23 224 5 183 51
b*p*s p+s 20 609 10689 455 12119 1 57 44 196 12 136 50
b+p+s b+p 14 663 30462 2217 1489 1 29 93 87 50 53 137
b+p+s p+s 0 253 32268 1307 446 0 19 74 40 53 24 182
b+p p+s 14 691 30187 1960 1903 1 46 115 88 58 33 129
Fig. 2. Comparison of invariants for clients Box (top) and Polka (bottom). Meaning of
columns from left: “1st”/“2nd” - 1st/2nd compared configuration, “fail” - failures of Z3,
“neq” - incomparable (neither is stronger), “eq” - logically equal, “1st”/“2nd” - 1st/2nd
configuration has stronger invariant ; “fail” - at least one Z3 failure, “neq” - contains
incomparable invariants, “1st”/“2nd” - 1st/2nd has at least one stronger invariant than
2nd/1st configuration, “1st!”/“2nd!” - at least one stronger but no weaker invariant in
1st/2nd than in 2st/1nd configuration, “eq!” - all invariant are logically equal.
– There is no configuration strictly dominating all others: We can only read
patterns in the data, like:
• A configurations with communicating clients gives us at least one order
of magnitude more precise invariants than isolated clients.
• More communicating clients, more strengthened invariants.
• Count of incomparable invariants and lower count of strengthened in-
variants can be expected in the same order of magnitude.
• More improved invariants typically yields more improved benchmarks,
i.e. improvements are rather regularly distributed than highly concen-
trated in few benchmarks. Nevertheless, a degree of correlation is sensi-
tive to kinds of clients appearing in configurations, cf. fourth and sixth
rows for both Box and Polka.
Observations made for invariants can easily be adopted to similar observa-
tions for benchmarks.
Data in both tables in Fig. 2 for the configuration b*p*s show that the com-
munication also weakened some invariants. Since this might be counter-intuitive,
we show on a simple example how a precise information delivered to an anal-
ysis may actually lead to a worse result: consider the interval analysis with a
widening applied on a C code “... while (i<10) ++i; ...” s.t. it reaches the
while statement with the value i = [0, 50]. This implies the result [0, 50] for i
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at the loop head. If we deliver a precise value [0, 0] to i before the loop, then
the widening operator will produce a weaker result [0,∞] at the loop head.
Configuration Success Time-out Memory-out Crash
1st 2nd eq 1st 2nd eq 1st 2nd eq 1st 2nd eq 1st 2nd
b*p*s b+p+s 251 35 24 10 0 38 137 19 0 7 14 6
b*p*s b+p 285 1 25 10 0 3 143 13 0 7 14 0
b*p*s b+s 230 56 23 10 0 200 0 156 0 7 14 3
b+p+s b+p 275 0 35 13 35 0 137 0 6 7 6 0
b+p+s b+s 241 34 12 45 3 165 0 137 0 10 3 0
b+p b+s 245 65 8 12 1 198 0 143 0 7 0 3
Configuration Success Time-out Memory-out Crash
1st 2nd eq 1st 2nd eq 1st 2nd eq 1st 2nd eq 1st 2nd
b*p*s b+p+s 263 21 30 10 0 20 137 21 0 7 14 6
b*p*s b+p 283 1 28 10 0 2 143 15 0 7 14 0
b*p*s p+s 267 17 27 10 0 15 143 15 0 7 14 4
b+p+s b+p 289 4 22 10 20 2 137 0 6 7 6 0
b+p+s p+s 287 6 7 21 9 4 137 0 6 11 2 0
b+p p+s 294 17 0 12 0 13 143 0 0 7 0 4
Configuration Success Time-out Memory-out Crash
1st 2nd eq 1st 2nd eq 1st 2nd eq 1st 2nd eq 1st 2nd
b*p*s b+p+s 151 3 0 155 0 35 119 16 0 12 17 1
b*p*s b+s 148 6 7 155 0 153 0 136 0 10 19 0
b*p*s p+s 149 5 0 155 0 34 124 11 0 11 18 0
b+p+s b+s 147 4 8 190 0 118 0 119 0 10 3 0
b+p+s p+s 148 3 1 185 5 4 119 0 5 11 2 0
b+s p+s 148 7 1 189 119 0 0 0 124 10 0 1
Fig. 3. Comparison of termination states for clients Box (top), Polka (middle), and
Symbolic execution (bottom). Columns of “Configuration”: “1st”/“2nd” - 1st/2nd
compared configuration ; All other columns: “eq” - equal state, “1st”/“2nd” - 1st/2nd
configuration has the state while 2nd/1st has some other.
In the second measurement we focused on comparison of termination states
of individual clients as they are used in different configurations. We distinguish
termination states “Success”, “Time-out”, “Memory-out”, and “Crash”, all with
obvious meanings. Results are presented in Fig. 3. Numbers in each table repre-
sent counts of benchmarks. We can observe the following facts in data in Fig. 3:
– Consumption of resources via communication does not imply a decrease of
successful termination: Considering “Success” data for all configurations
comparing with b*p*s for all clients, the communication caused a loss of
success termination states in the following percentages:
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1st 2nd Box Polka Sym.exec.
b*p*s b+p+s 3.8 -3.2 1.9
b*p*s b+p -8.4 -9.5 -
1st 2nd Box Polka Sym.exec.
b*p*s b+s 11.5 - -0.6
b*p*s p+s - -3.5 3.2
In 5 of 9 cases we see an increase of “Success” termination states. The average
of these numbers is -0.53%. We may thus expect about 0.5% increase of
“Success” termination states on average per client due to reduced overall
time and memory consumption.
– Resources consumption via communication heavily depends on kinds of clients:
This statement is based on the following patterns which dominate data:
• Symbolic execution is a major source of “Time-out” termination states.
We can see this in the tables of all clients: Whenever the client is present,
there is a high count of time-outs.
• Polka is a major source of “Memory-out” termination states. We can see
this in the tables of all clients: Whenever the client is present, there is a
high count of memory-outs.
We observed two kinds of crashes during the evaluation. The wast majority of
them occurs inside the Apron [25] library and the remaining crashes occur when
parsing complex initialiser lists. Although all the crashes can be caused by our
wrong use of those modules, we was unable to find the causes in a reasonable
time. Nevertheless, we can easily compute from the numbers in Fig. 3 that a
configuration crashed on 57.2 from all 473 benchmarks on average. It means
that each configuration was evaluated on 415,8 benchmarks on average without
a crash. We believe the count of 415 benchmarks still represent an evaluation of
a sufficient size.
We finish this section by presenting interesting data related to the source code
of our implementation. In the table bellow we show for all tree clients numbers
of source code lines required for implementation of individual protocol functions.
The abbreviation SE stands for the Symbolic execution and the numbers in the
brackets represent a code performing pure conversion of an abstract state to a
formula. Note that the number 0 for SE indicates that this client does not use
knowledge from other client; it only provides knowledge to others.
client’s protocol function Box Polka SE
get values 30 (+27) 29 (+76) 7 (+139)
on location outdated 63 63 0
is memory over approximated 3 3 1
can improve memory over approximation 3 3 1
summary 126 174 148
We see that implementation of protocol functions is indeed small, about 150
lines on average. Note that queries to the server consist of few lines per client.
Namely, Box and Polka calls the server (all kinds of queries together) on 6 lines
each and the Symbolic execution on 3 lines. We encourage a reader to inspect all
this communication-related source code to see also its simplicity. A ZIP package
with sources and Linux binaries together with the evaluation results is freely
available in [28]. Installation and use are both extremely simple. Nevertheless, a
reader may find details in Appendix B of our technical report [23].
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4 Related Work
There is a broad class of approaches dedicated to combining lattice-based anal-
yses. They are based on either direct or reduced product [9]. The direct product
is fully automatic, but composed analyses do not interact. The reduced prod-
uct is based on (non-computable) concretisation functions. This is solved either
by focusing on particular kinds of lattices [15,22] or by an approximation [14].
An open product [5] substantially improves [14], since it removes dependencies
between analyses. The only common property is a priory given set of queries.
This requirement was later relaxed in [3] by replacing the set of queries by a lan-
guage of the first order logic. Operations of all analyses are then parametrised
by any formula of the language. Composition of configurable program analy-
ses [1,2] is based on the direct product, whose precision can be improved via re-
lations “transfer”, “merge”, “stop”, “prec”, “compare”, and “strengthen”. They
are defined over domains of all composed analyses. We thus have to implement
them for each combination of analyses. Individual analyses do not have to be
changed, if they share the same internal program representation. Execution of
analyses is synchronised using a special lattice-based “location analysis” which
is supposed to appear among “regular” analyses in a combination. It defines
an exploration direction, e.g. forward, backward. An advanced combination of
lattice-based analyses can be found in [10]. It is based on the idea of the open
product with several extensions. The set of fixed queries was replaced by an
extensible set of kinds of constraints. An extension of the set by a new kind
implies extensions of only those analyses which want to use constraints of that
kind. Analyses may exchange messages through input and output channels. Mes-
sages are elements of a separate abstract domain. They are not always exchanged
freely between analyses. An order of analyses in a computational step matters.
Typically, an analysis may freely communicate with any predecessor. Analyses
are synchronised and they share the same internal program representation.
Approaches based on the open product [5,3,10] are closest to our model
because of independence of combining analyses. We can also find similarities
with [10,3] in formula-based communication. We further share the goal to max-
imally reuse existing analyses with [10,1,2]. On the other hand, our approach
allows individual analyses to operate on different internal program representa-
tions, analysers are extended once for all combinations, and there is no synchro-
nisation in computational steps (e.g. selection of program transitions) between
clients. Finally, an obvious difference is that our approach allows to combine
other than only lattice-based analyses.
There is another broad class of approaches based on combining program
analyses. Typically, two or more particular analyses are considered, e.g. pred-
icate abstraction with dynamic test generation [13], static checking and test-
ing [11,21], different testing techniques [6], symbolic and concrete execution [20],
static and dynamic analyses via program partitioning [16], data-flow with pred-
icate lattices [12], pointer and numerical analyses [24,19], data-flow analyses in
a compiler [4,18], etc., and a result is a new program analysis with advantages
of individual analyses. Clearly, all these analyses represent instances of the ap-
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proach mentioned at the beginning of the introduction. Our approach represents
an alternative: we do not build a new analysis from given analyses; we propose
an analysis-independent communication protocol.
5 Discussion
Whenever researchers have attempted to combine some program analyses so far,
they always focussed on solving a question “when exchange what information
between combined analyses” in order to get the best result from them. It means
that the output from their endeavour always was an algorithm standing above
combined analyses fully specifying what will be exchanged and when. There is
no doubt this process can yield efficient algorithms (see the previous section).
Nevertheless, nobody so far has answered the question “what are natural dispo-
sitions of analyses for their mutual cooperation”, i.e. how well they can perform
without any sort of supervision by an algorithm standing above them. This work
is supposed to fill this gap.
From the theoretical point of view it is interesting to know, what analyses
naturally cooperate well (i.e. without any supervision) with what others. We
have already given the answer in Section 3 for two popular abstract domains
of abstract interpretation (intervals and polyhedrons) and King’s symbolic exe-
cution. Another interesting question is, how much know algorithms combining
analyses actually improve over the presented natural (i.e. unsupervised, sponta-
neous, unorganised) cooperation. It is, of course, expected that such algorithms
should perform better, but the question is how much.
The proposed approach can also be useful from the practical point of view.
For instance, it can aid in the process of inventing new algorithms combining
existing analyses. This process typically starts by choosing “right” analyses to
combine. The choice is usually based on researcher’s intuition. If we realise that
for n available analyses there is an exponential number (2n − n− 1) of possible
combinations, the intuition may easily lead him to a sub-optimal choice and ad
hoc trying more combinations may cost him months. Using our approach the
researcher may quickly experimentally evaluate several combinations of analyses
and use the received data to improve his intuition. The data can indeed be
obtained quickly. According to results in the Section 3 he can roughly expect
150 source code lines per analyser for integration of the protocol. Analysers
with the protocol integrated are ready to use in any possible combination. The
obtained data can also be useful in later stages of the process. For example, the
researcher may search in the data for cases where the communication produced
interesting results (impressive or pure). Their analysis may help the researcher to
uncover key principles for an efficient algorithm combining the chosen analyses.
6 Conclusion
We presented an light-weight approach allowing cooperation of analysers during
their simultaneous analysis of a given program. It suffices to integrate the intro-
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duced communication protocol into n analysers, and we can then immediately
try any of their 2n − n − 1 possible combinations. An analyser communicates
with others according its actual personal needs. So, there is no central algo-
rithm standing above analysers which would tell them when to communicate
what information. Our experimental evaluation provides an empirical evidence
that program analyses based on abstract interpretation and symbolic execution
have natural dispositions for mutual cooperation in the presented communica-
tion model.
References
1. D. Beyer, T. A. Henzinger, and G. The´oduloz. Configurable software verifica-
tion: Concretizing the convergence of model checking and program analysis. In
Proceedings of CAV, pages 504–518. Springer-Verlag, 2007.
2. D. Beyer, T. A. Henzinger, and G. The´oduloz. Program analysis with dynamic
precision adjustment. In Proceedings of ASE, pages 29–38. IEEE, 2008.
3. N. Charlton. Verification of Java programs with interacting analysis plugins. Elec-
tron. Notes Theor. Comput. Sci., 145:131–150, 2006.
4. C. Click and K. D. Cooper. Combining analyses, combining optimizations. ACM
Trans. Program. Lang. Syst., 17(2):181–196, 1995.
5. A. Cortesi, B. Le Charlier, and P. Van Hentenryck. Combinations of abstract
domains for logic programming: Open product and generic pattern construction.
Sci. Comput. Program., 38(1-3):27–71, 2000.
6. D. Cotroneo, R. Pietrantuono, and S. Russo. A learning-based method for com-
bining testing techniques. In Proceedings of ICSE, pages 142–151. IEEE, 2013.
7. P. Cousot and R. Cousot. Static determination of dynamic properties of programs.
In Proceedings of ISOP, pages 106–130. Dunod, Paris, France, 1976.
8. P. Cousot and R. Cousot. Abstract interpretation: A unified lattice model for static
analysis of programs by construction or approximation of fixpoints. In Proceedings
of the POPL, pages 238–252. ACM, 1977.
9. P. Cousot and R. Cousot. Systematic design of program analysis frameworks. In
Proceedings of POPL, pages 269–282. ACM, 1979.
10. P. Cousot, R. Cousot, J. Feret, L. Mauborgne, A. Mine´, D. Monniaux, and X. Rival.
Combination of abstractions in the ASTRE´E static analyzer. In Proceedings of
ASIAN, pages 272–300. Springer-Verlag, 2007.
11. C. Csallner and Y. Smaragdakis. Check ’n’ crash: Combining static checking and
testing. In Proceedings of ICSE, pages 422–431. ACM, 2005.
12. J. Fischer, R. Jhala, and R. Majumdar. Joining dataflow with predicates. SIG-
SOFT Softw. Eng. Notes, 30(5):227–236, 2005.
13. P. Godefroid, A. V. Nori, S. K. Rajamani, and S. D. Tetali. Compositional may-
must program analysis: Unleashing the power of alternation. SIGPLAN Not.,
45(1):43–56, 2010.
14. P. Granger. Improving the results of static analyses programs by local decreasing
iteration. In Proceedings of FSTTCS, pages 68–79. Springer-Verlag, 1992.
15. S. Gulwani and A. Tiwari. Combining abstract interpreters. SIGPLAN Not.,
41(6):376–386, 2006.
16. P. Jalote, V. Vangala, T. Singh, and P. Jain. Program partitioning: A framework
for combining static and dynamic analysis. In Proceedings of WODA, pages 11–16.
ACM, 2006.
19
17. J. C. King. Symbolic execution and program testing. Commun. ACM, 19(7):385–
394, 1976.
18. S. Lerner, D. Grove, and C. Chambers. Composing dataflow analyses and trans-
formations. SIGPLAN Not., 37(1):270–282, 2002.
19. A. Mine´. Field-sensitive value analysis of embedded C programs with union types
and pointer arithmetics. SIGPLAN Not., 41(7):54–63, 2006.
20. K. Sen, D. Marinov, and G. Agha. CUTE: A concolic unit testing engine for C.
SIGSOFT Softw. Eng. Notes, 30(5):263–272, 2005.
21. Y. Smaragdakis and C. Csallner. Combining static and dynamic reasoning for bug
detection. In Proceedings of TAP, pages 1–16. Springer-Verlag, 2007.
22. A. Toubhans, B.-Y. Chang, and X. Rival. Reduced product combination of ab-
stract domains for shapes. In Proceedings of VMCAI, volume 7737, pages 375–395.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013.
23. M. Trt´ık. Anonymous on-line communication between program analyses. arXiv
1504.07862, Technical report and specification, http://arxiv.org/abs/1504.
07862.
24. A. Venet and G. Brat. Precise and efficient static array bound checking for large
embedded C programs. SIGPLAN Not., 39(6):231–242, 2004.
25. Apron. http://apron.cri.ensmp.fr/library.
26. Bugst. git://git.code.sf.net/p/bugst/src.
27. CPAchecker. http://cpachecker.sosy-lab.org.
28. Evaluation package. https://github.com/trtikm/aocbpa/releases/tag/v1.
0.
29. KLEE. https://klee.github.io/.
30. SMT-LIB. http://www.smt-lib.org.
31. SV-COMP. http://sv-comp.sosy-lab.org.
20
